The Centralization of the Banking Industry: Dodd-Frank\u27s Impact on Community Banks and the Need for Both Regulatory Relief and an Overhaul of the Current Framework by Newell, Bryce W.
DePaul Business and Commercial 
Law Journal 
Volume 15 
Issue 1 Fall 2016 Article 1 
The Centralization of the Banking Industry: Dodd-Frank's Impact 
on Community Banks and the Need for Both Regulatory Relief and 
an Overhaul of the Current Framework 
Bryce W. Newell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/bclj 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the 
Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
15 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Business and Commercial Law Journal by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. 
For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-1\DPB101.txt unknown Seq: 1 24-APR-17 14:00
The Centralization of the Banking Industry:
Dodd-Frank’s Impact on Community Banks and
the Need for Both Regulatory Relief and
an Overhaul of the Current Framework
Bryce W. Newell*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”)1 has a number of controversial and dis-
puted features.  Nonetheless, Dodd-Frank’s purpose is, “[t]o promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consum-
ers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”2
Thus, one of the central purposes of Dodd-Frank is to end the banking
industry’s “too big to fail” banks in order to protect taxpayers from
bailing out these big banks.  This objective has been approached
through a massive increase in regulatory oversight of the entire bank-
ing industry, including small and local commercial banks.  Yet, since
2010, when Dodd-Frank was introduced, the five biggest banks in
America have grown in market share.3
In December 2012, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) commissioned a study on community banking.4  This study de-
fined community banks based on “criteria related to traditional lend-
ing and deposit gathering activities and limited geographic scope.”5
At the end of 2010, 94% of all banking organizations fit this defini-
tion, but, as of 2011, community banks “held [only 14%] of banking
* Mr. Newell graduated Cum Laude from DePaul University College of Law.  Prior to that
Mr. Newell graduated Magna Cum Laude at DePaul University, majoring in Finance and Philos-
ophy.  Mr. Newell lives in New York City with his wife and son.  He is an Associate in the
Consumer Financial Services Group at Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
2. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
3. Jeff Cox, 5 Biggest Banks Now Own Almost Half the Industry, CNBC  (Apr. 15, 2015, 2:33
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/15/5-biggest-banks-now-own-almost-half-the-industry.html.
4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY (Dec. 2012), https://www
.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/cbi/report/cbi-full.pdf.
5. Id. at I.
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industry assets.”6  This means that just 6% of banks held the other
86% of banking industry assets.  The study also found that the bank-
ing industry has been consolidating dramatically since 1984, and “the
share of [United States] banking assets held by community banks de-
clined from [38%] to [14%]” over this time period.7
The transition of the banking system from local-oriented commu-
nity banks to national megabanks could have far reaching conse-
quences.  Dodd-Frank could actually be enhancing the consolidation
of the banking industry, in direct opposition to its principal purpose –
eliminating “too big too fail” banks.  While the industry has intention-
ally trended towards consolidation in the past, the current dramatic
increase of consolidation of banking assets is likely an unintended
consequence of increased regulation.  This consequence comes from
astronomical regulatory costs passed on to community banks, as well
as increased capital requirements that diminish these banks’ competi-
tiveness.  Dodd-Frank has exacerbated this problem, and it will likely
result in further increased consolidation of the banking industry.
This Article argues that the focus of regulation must first refrain
from being overly broad.  The current climate illuminates the
problems of overbroad regulation.  Dodd-Frank not only introduces
new rules, but it also creates numerous regulatory bodies that govern
the financial services industry, such as the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council, to oversee financial institutions.8  The Act produced a
substantial litany of new responsibilities, rules, regulations, and re-
quirements that come with increased costs.
Dodd-Frank was a reactive piece of legislation following the Great
Recession.  This Article argues that it is overbroad, and, consequently,
it helps promote the very problem that its aim was to eliminate: “too
big to fail” banking institutions.  The solution is to substantially mini-
mize regulation of banks that have less than $10 billion in assets.  Be-
yond this, a new regulatory framework is needed to maximize the
effectiveness of regulation.  This new regulatory framework will call
on the states to have control over the regulation of community banks
located within their borders.  A state system of regulation will pro-
mote the necessary focus for regulation to be effective, and it also will
enhance the ability of federal regulators to focus exclusively on large
banking institutions that pose systemic risk to the economy. By insti-
tuting legislation similar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 4 (2010), http://
media.mofo.com/files/uploads/images/summarydoddfrankact.pdf.
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this type of regulation would continue to have a uniform approach:
where for the most part, the regulations will be uniform throughout
the country, but enforcement will be independently administered by
the states.
This approach would help to ensure that community banks have the
ability to compete within the market by decreasing their regulatory
burdens and costs.  Large banks benefit from economies of scale that
diminish the impact of regulatory costs.  However, small community
banks pay a higher price to comply with the overly burdensome regu-
latory costs.  This Article’s main argument is that the FDIC should
continue its recent trend of loosening community-banking regulations
in order to maintain the competitive balance of the banking industry.9
The Dodd-Frank Act generated enormous regulatory costs, and it is
possible that this, along with a mix of other regulatory factors, has
diminished the importance of community banks.  Part II of this Arti-
cle will discuss community banks: how they are defined, why they are
important, and how they should be identified under any regulatory
framework. Part III will discuss the impact Dodd-Frank has had on
community banks and on large institutional banks.  Part IV will dis-
cuss the regulatory regime that should be adopted, which will increase
the effectiveness of regulation for both community banks and the larg-
est banking institutions.  Part IV will also define what the framework
is, how it would be implemented, and what the benefits and possible
burdens would be.  Finally, Part V will conclude by reiterating both
the fundamental purpose of regulation as well as why this proposed
method will work best.
II. COMMUNITY BANKS
The American banking industry has historically been decentralized,
especially when compared to the rest of the Western world.  Past
banking regulation severely limited the ability of banks to diversify
geographically in the United States.10  The United State has tradition-
ally been wary of too much concentration in the banking industry.
Thus, the banking industry model has been influenced by a large num-
ber of small local banks throughout the country.  However, as deregu-
lation of this model took place in the early 1980s, the industry
9. See Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., To the FDIC Community
Banking Conference: Strategies for Long-Term Success 5 (Apr. 6, 2016), https://fdic.gov/news/
news/speeches/spapr0616.pdf.
10. William Keeton, Jim Harvey & Paul Willis, The Role of Community Banks in the U.S.
Economy, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., 2nd Quarter 2003, at 15, 15,
https://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/econrev/Pdf/2q03keet.pdf.
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experienced a shift towards large megabanks concentrating much of
the market share.
A. Definition of a Community Bank
Defining which banking institutions fall into the category of “com-
munity bank” is an important aspect to the discussion of Dodd-
Frank’s impact on such banks.  Different scholars and industry ana-
lysts have attempted to define community banks in a variety of ways.
Typically, community banks are defined as smaller banks or
standalone banks that focus “on providing basic banking activities to a
local community.”11  However, such a definition does not capture all
community banks, and it is too narrow for the purposes of regulation.
There is also an inherent subjective aspect to this definition of com-
munity bank.  For instance, defining “community” is itself a difficult
task:  how large is a community? where does it start? where does it
end?  When there are subjective components involved, this brings
about a discretionary feature in establishing a definition.  This is one
reason why regulators often disagree as to “what constitutes a com-
munity bank.”12  When the regulators cannot agree on a definition of
a community bank, the task of regulating banks in a streamlined and
tailored approach becomes much more difficult.  Thus, this section
discusses the implications of a proper working definition of “commu-
nity bank,” the pros and cons of such a definition, and how this defini-
tion can be incorporated into the larger regulatory framework of the
banking industry.
The first question regulators must deal with is whether the defini-
tion of community banks should be broad or narrow.  A broad defini-
tion of community banks encompasses three main components.13
First, a broader definition of community banks will ensure that more
banks around the country will be able to compete against the econo-
mies of scale of larger banks.  Second, it will dissuade the continued
consolidation of the banking industry because merging for the sake of
economies of scale will be less of an incentive.  Third, it will ensure
that most, if not all, community banks will have access to decreased
regulation.
11. Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, The State and Fate of Community Banking 3 (Harv. Ken-
nedy Sch. M-RCBG Assoc. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 37, 2015).
12. Id. at 4 (noting that the three largest federal banking regulators – the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (OCC), the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve Board – all use different
definitions).
13. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4.
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Those in favor of a narrow definition of community banks may ar-
gue that an overly broad definition could lead to many banks escaping
regulation.  Arguably, this could be an exploitable loophole in the reg-
ulation of the banking sector, and it could potentially lead to behavior
that is contrary to the economic health of the banking industry. Banks
could attempt to manipulate their holdings in order to qualify as com-
munity banks, when they should not.  However, too narrow of a defi-
nition would essentially result in a regulatory approach that does not
acknowledge or eradicate the current problem of the banking indus-
try, that is, the trend of increased consolidation.
Thus, regulators must first agree on the proper definition of a com-
munity bank.  However, outlining a regulatory exemption that applies
to a certain sector of the banking industry will undoubtedly be met
with various attacks from all sides.  A new regulatory framework must
be instituted in order to prevent community banks from continuing
their rapid decline.  Further, it is imperative to curtail the growth of
megabanks and the increase of “too big to fail” institutions.  Thus, a
proper definition of community banks is mandatory in order to have
any useful impact on the current situation.
B. How Community Banks Are Currently Defined By Regulators
The FDIC’s study of community banking developed a “workable
definition” of community banks.14  “[T]he study develops a new re-
search definition of a community bank around criteria related to tradi-
tional lending and deposit gathering activities and limited
geographical scope.”15  Using this definition, the FDIC found that
about 94% of all banking organizations fell within this category, in-
cluding 330 larger banks that likely would “have been excluded if as-
set size were the only criterion.”16  This definition seems to be broad
enough to capture the entire category of community banks.
The FDIC found that, as of 2011, community banks “held [14%] of
banking industry assets, but [46%] of the industry’s small loans to
farms and businesses.”17  This implies another aspect to the definition:
small loans are inextricably tied to community banking.  The FDIC
focused on this aspect and attempted to bring in banks that “tend to
be relationship lenders, characterized by local ownership . . . and local
decision making.”18  There seems to be a sense of “locality” involved
14. Id. at A-1.
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with “community,” but these terms are tough for regulators to ade-
quately express via regulation.  This could help explain why the cur-
rent regulatory framework of  “one size fits all” does not adequately
capture the needs of community banks.
The FDIC bases its definition of community bank on the geographic
scope as well as the focus of banks’ lending habits.19  Interestingly,
they do not include a maximum cap on what institution qualifies as a
community bank.20  This is simply unfeasible in applicability because
there is no way to apply a regulatory framework without having a
bright-line base point as to who qualifies as a community bank.  This is
a major flaw in the FDIC’s study, and its failure to establish a size
limit on the community bank definition illustrates FDIC’s hesitancy to
change the regulatory framework.  Even though there are several
technical factors that the FDIC utilizes to further narrow down what a
community bank is, they fail to contribute a definition that could be
applied by regulatory bodies.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report in
2012 that analyzed the impact Dodd-Frank has had on community
banks.21  This report defined community banks as any bank that has
total assets of less than $10 billion.22  This comprised 99% of the in-
dustry, about 7,400 banks, but “the majority of community banks have
$250 million or less in total assets.”23  There are 109 banks that have
more than $10 billion in total assets,24 which is less than 1% of all
United States banks.  This is a significant disparity that highlights the
dramatic differences between community banks and large institutional
megabanks.
The GAO definition is broader than the FDIC definition.  Under
the GAO’s definition, community banks held approximately “[20%]
of the industry’s total assets in 2011.”25  However, both definitions
come from different starting points.  The GAO used size as the sole
criteria for the purpose of the report.26  Size is extremely important in
the characterization of community banks because size is what essen-
19. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at I.
20. See id.
21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-881, COMMUNITY BANKS AND CREDIT
UNIONS: IMPACT OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT DEPENDS LARGELY ON FUTURE MARKET RULINGS
(2012).
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id.
24. See NAT’L INFO. CTR., U.S. FED. RESERVE SYS., Holding Companies with Assets Greater
Than $10 Billion, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/
nicweb/HCSGreaterThan10B.aspx (last visited Dec. 24, 2016).
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 5.
26. Id.
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tially differentiates a community bank from a large bank.  Therefore,
size should unquestionably play a role in the definition of community
bank.  It is also possible to harmonize the GAO’s definition with the
FDIC’s definition in order to adequately capture the essence of com-
munity banks.
Common industry practice utilizes size as a method to determine
which banks qualify as community banks.27  This method is the easiest
to apply, and it provides a clear bright-line approach to defining com-
munity banks.  While community banks are often viewed as relation-
ship-oriented lenders doing most of their business in the community
where they are located, such a definition has difficulty in application.
The best method of identifying community banks is by size.
An approach based on size is easy to apply by regulators and illus-
trates a bright-line on who qualifies as a community bank and who
does not.  However, the proper size threshold is important in the clas-
sification.  Any bank that has less than $10 billion in total assets
should qualify as a community bank, and these banks should be regu-
lated accordingly.  Banks that have holdings of more than $10 billion
in assets pose significant systemic risk to the economy.  Four of these
109 banks have assets over $1 trillion.28  If these banks fail, economic
collapse could ensue.  Thus, these banks require a more encompassing
form of regulation.  However, because community banks do not pose
these same risks, they should have regulations that are refined for
their economic impact.
C. The Importance of Community Banking to the U.S. Economy
In 2012, Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, discussed the
value of community banks on the economy.29  Bernanke stated that
community banks play “a critical role” in local economies by lending
in their regions.30  He also noted that community banks are better
able to adapt to the changing needs of their customers because of the
“close ties” they have in “the communities they serve.”31  These ef-
fects happen at the local level, but there is a multiplier effect that res-
onates on the national economy.32
27. See generally FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4.
28. See Chris Vanderpool, 5 Banks Hold more than 44% of US Industry’s Assets, SNL (Dec.
12, 2014, 2:04 PM), https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-30025507-14130.
29. The Importance of Community Banking: A Conversation with Chairman Ben Bernanke,
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Community banks are integral in the communities that they serve.
Community banks have long standing relationships with their custom-
ers, and these relationships lead to a deeper knowledge of a custom-
ers’ creditworthiness.  This intimate knowledge allows community
banks to play a critical role in helping local business develop.  Rather
than determining the riskiness of a loan based on electronic models
and a “one size fits all” approach typically taken by institutional
banks, community banks are able to prioritize risk based on actual
knowledge gleaned from established working relationships with cus-
tomers.  This is a unique and important characteristic that illustrates
the importance of community banks to small business in the United
States economy.  Community banks make almost half of all small bus-
iness loans, and they continue to play a vital role in local economies.33
Developing a deeper understanding of relationship banking is an inte-
gral part of economic growth.
Institutional banks have standardized the way loans are made.34
While there are obvious benefits, there is also the adverse effect of
minimizing the importance of face-to-face interaction.  Face-to-face
interaction can help banks analyze the potential risks of a loan by ex-
amining more than just a person’s credit score.35  A standardized ap-
proach underscores the importance of a person’s character.  When a
bank makes a loan, they take a risk.  They are betting that the loanee
will repay the loan.  When a bank makes a small business loan, they
are also betting, to some extent, that the business will be successful
enough to repay the debt.  Thus, for many, an individual’s character
and integrity are fundamental in determining whether someone will
qualify for a business loan.  Institutional banks have minimized the
importance of relationship banking by utilizing models and statistics in
order to determine whether someone will qualify for a loan.36  Large
megabanks base their loan decisions almost exclusively on data and
credit reports, but they fail to acknowledge individual attributes.
33. See Lael Brainard, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Community Banking in
the 21st Century, the Third Annual Community Banking Research and Policy Conference Cos-
ponsored by the Federal Reserve System and Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri: Community Banks, Small Business Credit, and
Online Lending 3 (Sep. 30, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brai-
nard20150930a.pdf.
34. See, e.g., Uniform Residential Loan Application, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae
.com/content/guide_form/1003rev.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
35. Don’t Neglect Face-To-Face Banking Interactions, LENDING SOLUTIONS CONSULTING:
LSCI BLOG, http://www.rexcuadvice.com/blog/dont-neglect-face-face-banking-interactions (last
visited Feb. 16, 2017).
36. See Keeton, Harvey & Willis, supra note 10, at 15.
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III. CONSOLIDATION OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT
One recent study illustrates the trend of consolidation of the bank-
ing industry.37  Federal agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, and pri-
vate organizations have collected data on this subject.38  The banking
industry’s consolidation began well before the passing of Dodd-Frank.
However, Dodd-Frank and its plethora of regulatory agencies have
increased the rate of consolidation for a variety of reasons.
The consolidation of the banking industry began with the deregula-
tion of locality requirements for banks in the 1980s.39  Prior to this,
banking operations were restricted geographically,40 and it was diffi-
cult for banks to have branches across states.  The geographic restric-
tions were a central tenet in the decentralization of the banking
industry.  There were many benefits of the deregulation, but an unin-
tended consequence was the rapid consolidation of the industry due to
mergers and rapid growth from the largest banks.  These large banks
serve a fundamental purpose within the financial sector, and it would
be counterproductive to unilaterally stop free market activity.  How-
ever, regulation affects different size banks in different ways, and
there is a disproportionately negative effect that regulation has on
smaller banks.  It is important to note from the outset that consolida-
tion has not been brought about solely by Dodd-Frank, but, rather,
this Article argues that Dodd-Frank continues to escalate
consolidation.
A. Banking Statistics and Consolidation Data
According to an FDIC Statistics comparison report, as of December
31, 2015, 27.8% of banks have assets under $100 million, yet these
banks have a total of .59% of all banking assets.41  The same report
shows that 61.4% of all commercial banks have assets between $100
million and $1 billion, but these banks control only 6.81% of all bank-
ing assets in the United States.42  Finally, 10.8% of all commercial
37. See Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, supra note 11.
38. Id.
39. See generally Philip E. Strahan, The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation, 85 FED.
RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 111, 114 (2003), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/
review/03/07/Strahan.pdf.
40. See generally Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in the U.S. Banking In-
dustry: Is the “Long, Strange Trip” About to End?, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 31, 37 (2005), https://
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006jan/article2/article2.pdf.
41. Standard Industry Reports: Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI), FED. DEPOSIT.
INS.CORP., https://www5.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp?formname=standard (click on “Run Report”
hyperlink in Standard Report #1 section) (last visited Dec. 25, 2016).
42. Id.
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banks have assets over $1 billion, but these 10% control 92.6% of all
banking assets in the United States.43  These are remarkable statistics,
generated on the FDIC website.44  The total number of reporting in-
stitutions in 2015 was 5338 commercial banks, according to the FDIC
website.45  The actual number is thus between 5338 and 7400 banks,
depending on the statistics utilized.46
As of December 31, 2010, there were 6519 commercial banks re-
porting to the FDIC.47  In the past six years alone, there are 1181
fewer banks, but there has been an increase of 67 banks with assets
over $1 billion.  Since 1980, there have been over 10,000 mergers in
the banking industry, involving over $7 trillion in acquired assets.48
Since 2000, there has been a decline of 3354 banks with assets of less
than $100 million.49  This means that the industry went from having
58% of banks with assets under $100 million in 2000, to now only
27.8% of banks with assets under $100 million.50  “The relaxation of
restrictions on intrastate branching and interstate banking that took
place in the 1980s and early 1990s facilitated both mergers and consol-
idations.”51  This illustrates that the banking industry is consolidating,
and it has been in this state for a number of years.  However, it is
unclear the impact that this will have on the U.S. economy as a whole,
and it is unclear the exact extent that Dodd-Frank has had on speed-
ing up the consolidation process.
The data above is compelling proof that the industry is consolidat-
ing. This consolidation process means that more banks have assets
over $1 billion and substantially less banks have assets under $100 mil-
lion.  To further illustrate this point, there are currently 576 banks, as
of December 31, 2015, that have assets over $1 billion, which is ap-
proximately 11% of the total number of banks in the United States.52




46. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 21, at 5.
47. FED. DEPOSIT. INS. CORP., supra note 41 (click on “Run Report” hyperlink in Standard
Report #1 section).
48. Robert M. Adams, Consolidation and Merger Activity in the United States Banking Indus-
try from 2000 Through 2010 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper
No. 2012-51, 2012), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201251/201251pap.pdf.
49. FED. DEPOSIT. INS. CORP., supra note 41 (follow the same process, but, after the report is
run change the dates under “Report Dates” to the year 2000 and press the “Update Report”
button located to the left of the “Report Dates” field).
50. Id.
51. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at 2–2. R
52. See FED. DEPOSIT. INS. CORP., supra note 41.
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the United States.53  The big banks clearly have substantial market
power, while smaller banks’ market power has diminished
considerably.
To be clear, the banking industry consolidating is minimally im-
pacted by bank failures.  Since October 1, 2000, there have been 543
bank failures.54  However, since 1990, there have been 6.5 bank merg-
ers for every one bank failure.55  Roughly 2900 banking institutions
have failed between 1980 and 2013, but in that time “the total number
of bank charters . . . dropped from approximately 20,000 to 6812.”56
Bank failures are overall less impactful on the consolidation than
mergers, acquisitions, and organizational consolidations.57
The pattern of decline of the smaller banks has been mirrored by an
equally substantial pattern of growth of the largest U.S. banks.  Since
1984, “the largest banks – those with assets over $10 billion – grew
elevenfold . . . raising their share of industry assets from [27%] in 1984
to [80%] in 2011.”58  Industry analysts attribute a number of forces to
industry consolidation during this time period, but it is becoming clear
that Dodd-Frank and other banking regulations are a contributing
cause of accelerated consolidation.59  “From 2011 through 2014, the
number of voluntary mergers increased each year.”60  “Mergers in-
creased from 73 in 2011 to 162 in 2014.”61  The increase in mergers
illustrates how consolidation continues to be the trend in the Ameri-
can banking industry, and Dodd-Frank, passed in 2010, continues to
play a role in why banks choose to merge.
The Riegel-Neal Act of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 helped set up the conditions for the four largest banks’ assets and
liabilities to grow rapidly in the years preceding the financial crisis.62
53. Id.
54. Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/
banklist.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2016) (showing a constantly updated list of failed banks since
October 1, 2000).
55. Bob Solomon, The Fall (and Rise?) of Community Banking: The Continued Importance of
Local Institutions, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 945, 947 (2012).
56. Tanya D. Marsh & Joseph W. Norman, Reforming the Regulation of Community Banks
After Dodd-Frank, 90 IND. L. J. 179, 185 (2015).
57. Id.
58. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at I.
59. Marsh & Norman, supra note 56, at 185.
60. Michael Kowalik et al., Bank Consolidation and Merger Activity Following the Crisis, 100
FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., 1st Quarter 2015, at 31, 34, https://www.kan
sascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/15q1Kowalik-Davig-Morris-Regehr.pdf.
61. Id.
62. Martin Neil Baily et al., The Big Four Banks: The Evolution of the Financial Sector, Part I,
BROOKINGS INST. 10 (May 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/big_
four_banks_evolution_financial_sector_pt1_final.pdf.
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Banks took advantage of these laws, which gave them the ability to
consolidate and expand geographically.63  Even after the crisis, the
U.S. government continued to encourage the acquisition of troubled
financial institutions by more secure ones.64  The result is that the five
biggest banks in America now own nearly half of the industry’s as-
sets.65  Dodd-Frank was intended to eliminate “too big to fail” status,
but it is clear that too big to fail banks have actually increased in size
since the financial crisis.
B. Increasing Costs of Regulation
It is difficult to pinpoint the overall costs associated with regulation
and what effect these costs have on consolidation; however, regulatory
costs are on the rise.66  Dodd-Frank is a likely contributor to rising
costs.  Indeed many community bankers have stated, “the cumulative
effects of regulatory requirements led them to increase staff over the
past ten years.”67  Further, the FDIC has proposed to study more de-
tailed information regarding regulatory costs, yet many community
banks have indicated that it would be costly to simply collect such
information.68  These costs have resulted in lower efficiencies for com-
munity banks.69  Over the same period, large banks efficiency has ac-
tually increased.70  This leads to the conclusion that increased
regulation has more pronounced negative effects on smaller banks
then it does for larger banks because large banks are able to pool
resources to create efficient regulatory mechanisms that community
banks do not have at their disposal.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cox, supra note 3.
66. Phil Hall, The Cost of Dodd-Frank: $24 Billion in Compliance, NAT’L MORTG. PROF’L
MAG. (July 15, 2015, 16:05), http://nationalmortgageprofessional.com/news/54936/cost-dodd-
frank-24-billion-compliance (citing to Ben Gitis et. al., Dodd-Frank At 5: Higher Costs, Uncer-
tain Benefits, AM. ACTION FORUM (July 14, 2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/re-
search/dodd-frank-at-5-higher-costs-uncertain-benefits)).
67. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at IV. R
68. Id.
69. See generally Ben Gitis, Andy Winkler & Sam Batkins, Dodd-Frank At 5: Higher Costs,
Uncertain Benefits, AM. ACTION F. (July, 14, 2015), https://www.americanactionforum.org/re
search/dodd-frank-at-5-higher-costs-uncertain-benefits; see also Ash Patel, Community Banks
Still Struggling with Compliance Costs: While Bank of America Might Be Able to Absorb Addi-
tional Compliance Costs, the Additional Rounds of Paperwork and Auditing Could Crush a Com-
munity Bank, CFO: AN ARGYLE COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2016), http://ww2.cfo.com/regulation/2016/
10/community-banks-still-struggling-compliance-costs; Hester Pierce, Ian Robinson & Thomas
Stratmann, How Are Small Banks Faring under Dodd-Frank? (George Mason Univ. Mercatus
Ctr., Working Paper No. 14-05, 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Peirce_SmallBank
Survey_v1.pdf.
70. See id.
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The FDIC claims that continuation of this trend depends on three
factors: 1) the ability of new community bank charters to enter the
industry, 2) when the normalization of interest rates will take place,
and 3) whether non-community banks will be able to generate nonin-
terest income and cut noninterest expenses.71  While these three fac-
tors are certainly important in determining how community banks will
remain competitive in the industry, this analysis severely discounts the
role regulation has in stifling competition for community banks. Regu-
lation, spearheaded by Dodd-Frank, created a playing field that favors
large banking institutions.  The irony is that Dodd-Frank’s goal was to
stop banks from becoming “too big to fail,” yet the outcome is a sys-
tem that perpetuates consolidation.  This leads to an increase of “too
big to fail” banks.  The only way to stop consolidation from continuing
is, first, recognize this problem, and second, change the existing regu-
latory structure in order to keep the competitive playing field in bal-
ance.  Large banks have the ability to minimize regulatory costs, but
community banks do not share in the economies of scale of large
banks.  This has led to huge profits for the large banks of the world
while community banks face the choice of merging or failing.
IV. DODD-FRANK AND ITS IMPACT
A. Background of Dodd-Frank
Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 2010 in response to the 2007 finan-
cial crisis.72  Dodd-Frank heavily regulates the banking and financial
industries.  This Act is the single largest regulatory mandate issued by
Congress over the banking industry.  Dodd-Frank is an 848 page bill
that is implemented by various federal regulatory agencies.73  On av-
erage, a new rule is implemented every 2.8 days.74  As of July 1, 2013,
there were over 13,789 pages of rules that have been created by over
ten regulators.75  These rules impact every area of the financial mar-
kets: the derivatives markets, consumer protection, mortgage reforms,
banking and systemic risk, and private funds.76  Thus, Dodd-Frank has
become the most comprehensive regulatory reform instituted over the
banking industry in United States history.
71. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at IV. R
72. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
73. See 3 Years of Dodd-Frank, DAVIS POLK, http://www.davispolkportal.com/infographic/
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Dodd-Frank compels both large banks and community banks to
meet new regulatory requirements even though community banks
played no substantial role in the financial crisis.  One reason Dodd-
Frank is overly broad is because of the regulatory requirements it im-
poses on community banks.  Community banks must maintain more
stringent capital requirements.77  These capital requirements are re-
strictive, burdensome, and costly to community banks.  A survey
taken in 2015 by the Independent Community Bankers of America
(ICBA) found that 73% of community banks reported that these new
regulations inhibit mortgage lending.78  As noted previously, commu-
nity banks drive economic growth in their communities, so restricting
community banks’ ability to lend money has detrimental effects on
local economies.
Dodd-Frank enables regulators to expand the scope of the Act sig-
nificantly because it directs federal regulatory agencies to implement
its provisions through 398 separate rulemaking requirements.79  Many
of these provisions allow agencies broad discretion to issue regulations
deemed “necessary and appropriate.”80  A good example of the dis-
cretionary powers applicable under Dodd-Frank is the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).81  The Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Act of 2010, Title X of Dodd-Frank, consolidates
rulemaking authority into one regulator, the CFPB.82  The statutory
language established less objective standards that provide the CFPB
wide discretionary latitude to determine the types of institutions that
fall within its regulatory reach.83  How the CFPB applies these stan-
dards “could significantly affect the scope of the [CFPB]’s powers, the
regulatory burden of covered entities, and the impact that the Bu-
reau’s actions have on consumer financial markets.”84  This is just one
77. Id.
78. ICBA Survey: 73 Percent of Community Banks Say Regulations Inhibiting Mortgage Lend-
ing, ICBA NEWS (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.icba.org/news/newsreleasedetail.cfm?ItemNumber=
190663&navItemNumber=183939.
79. DODD-FRANK PROGRESS REPORT, DAVIS POLK 2 (2014), https://www.davispolk.com/
Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report.
80. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41472, RULEMAKING REQUIRE-
MENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION ACT 4 (2010), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r41472.pdf.
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit.
X, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 26, 28, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
82. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
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example of the discretion Dodd-Frank provides to regulators under
the authority of the Act.
B. Impact of Dodd-Frank
Last year, a study concluded, “since the enactment of Dodd-Frank,
community banks have lost market share at twice the rate they did
prior to Dodd-Frank.”85  This study also noted, “regulatory costs tend
to fall proportionately heavier on smaller banks, which, in turn, tends
to promote consolidation of the industry.”86  Dodd-Frank’s impact is
industry consolidation.  If this is an unintended consequence of the
sweeping regulation, then regulators must act swiftly in order to re-
verse this trend.  Some analysts have questioned whether this conse-
quence was intended or not.87  Indeed, Rep. Jeb Hensarling stated in a
July 2015 speech:
The Dodd-Frank architecture, first of all, has made us less finan-
cially stable. . . .  Since the passage of Dodd-Frank, the big banks
are bigger and the small banks are fewer. But because Washington
can control a handful of big established firms much easier than
many small and zealous competitors, this is likely an intended con-
sequence of the Act. Dodd-Frank concentrates greater assets in
fewer institutions. It codifies into law ‘Too Big to Fail’ and taxpayer-
funded bailouts.88
It is clear that Dodd-Frank has promoted consolidation and has in-
creased “too big to fail” banks.
One study concluded that Dodd-Frank cost over $24 billion in com-
pliance costs.89  Further, Dodd-Frank created a burden of more than
61 million paperwork hours.90  This study illustrates that small finan-
cial firms have seen the most severe negative impact while the largest
companies have grown precipitously at a rate of 11.9% since 2010.91
The lack of job growth in the financial sector has been concentrated in
85. See Todd Zywicki, New Study Finds That Dodd-Frank Has Promoted Industry Consolida-
tion and Killed Community Banks, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/09/new-study-finds-that-dodd-frank-has-promoted-industry-
consolidation-and-killed-community-banks (citing to Lux & Greene, supra note 11.).
86. Lux & Greene, supra note 11, at 3.
87. See Ellen Brown, Killing Off Community Banks - Intended Consequence of Dodd-Frank?,
TRUTHOUT (Oct. 23 2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/33360-killing-off-community-
banks-intended-consequence-of-dodd-frank.
88. Ryan Smith, On Its Fifth Anniversary, Hensarling Slams Dodd-Frank, MORTG. PROF’L
AM. (July 22, 2015), http://www.mpamag.com/news/on-its-fifth-anniversary-hensarling-slams-
doddfrank-23302.aspx (quoting Rep. Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee).
89. See Hall, supra note 66.
90. Id.
91. Gitis, et. al., supra note 66.
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small and regional firms.92  However, since 2010, job growth in finan-
cial regulatory agencies has seen a substantial increase, with the indus-
try seeing an increase of 19.2%.93  Employment in the Federal
Reserve System increased 32.2% since Dodd-Frank’s enactment.94
This displays the intriguing fact that Dodd-Frank increased the regula-
tory industry, but with this increase, there has been a substantial de-
crease of smaller financial firms in the industry.
The GAO reported, “regulators, industry participants, and [Federal
Reserve] studies all find that consolidation is likely driven by regula-
tory economies of scale.”95  Marshall Lux further states, “large banks
are better suited to handle heightened regulatory burdens than . . .
smaller banks, causing the average costs of community banks to be
higher.”96  Even Federal Reserve Governor Tarullo noted, “[a]ny reg-
ulatory requirement is likely to be disproportionately costly for com-
munity banks, since the fixed costs associated with compliance must
be spread over a smaller base of assets.”97  Since economies of scale
have a direct impact on banks’ ability to shoulder the burden of regu-
latory costs, community banks have been impacted to a greater extent.
Thus, Dodd-Frank has had, and will continue to have, a greater impact
on community banks, than on large banks.  As Dodd-Frank continues
to be implemented, community banks will continue to suffer.
Dodd-Frank was enacted to curtail the influence of large institu-
tional banks, but the results have been the opposite.  Increased con-
solidation will lead to more “too big to fail” institutions because
mergers will naturally increase banks’ market share.  This is a dire
consequence of Dodd-Frank, whether intentional or not.  In order to
promote a more stable banking industry, regulators must adapt to the
problem of consolidation.  Turning the tide on consolidation requires
a regulatory framework that treats community banks as substantially
different than institutional banks.  It is essential that regulators elimi-
nate the current capital requirements and regulatory burdens that





95. Lux & Greene, supra note 11, at 21.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 22 (quoting Daniel Tarullo, member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board).
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V. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO COMMUNITY BANK REGULATION
Neel Kashkari, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneap-
olis, implored “Congress to consider ‘bold, transformational’ rules in-
cluding the breaking up of the nation’s largest banks to avoid
bailouts.”98  In his first speech as head of the Minneapolis Federal Re-
serve, Mr. Kashkari stated that Congress did not go far enough with
Dodd-Frank and that new solutions are necessary “to solve this prob-
lem once and for all.”99  Kashkari proposes that the nation’s big banks
should be broken up into smaller entities.100  He believes the biggest
banks are still “too big to fail” and continue to pose a significant risk
to the economy, even after Dodd-Frank.101
One possibility to overcome Dodd-Frank’s harmful effects on com-
munity banks would be to break up the largest banks and, at the same
time, to reduce regulation and compliance procedures over the entire
banking industry.  By breaking up the largest banks, Congress would
be significantly reducing the risk of a “too big to fail” economic col-
lapse resulting in another bailout situation.  However, any such bill
must recognize that small banks pose significantly less risk to the
economy.  Thus, it is imperative that any such regulation recognizes
that a new regulatory framework must be enacted in order to allow
banking to continue to operate effectively.  There are many pros and
cons to this approach; however, decentralization has historically been
a long-standing feature of United States banking.102  A potential de-
velopment could be the impact antitrust regulators will have as the
industry continues to consolidate.  With the five largest banks control-
ling nearly half of the industry, it leads to the question: When will
antitrust regulators mandate that continued consolidation must end?
Kashkari’s proposal, breaking up the big banks, may or may not be
a viable solution to the “too big to fail” problem.103  His proposal il-
lustrates how community banks should have an entirely different reg-
ulatory focus.104  There are different categories of banks, and federal
98. RUETERS & FORTUNE EDITORS, Break Up the Big Banks, Says the Fed’s New Guy, FOR-





102. See generally Richard Sylla, The US Banking System: Origin, Development, and Regula-
tion, GILDER LEHRMAN INST. AM. HISTORY, https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/
hamiltoneconomics/essays/us-banking-system-origin-development-and-regulation (last visited
Feb. 16, 2017).
103. RUETERS & FORTUNE EDITORS, supra note 98.
104. See id.
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regulation should be aimed at minimizing the risks that these catego-
ries present.  The economic risks posed by the largest banks are sub-
stantially greater than the economic risks posed by community banks.
However, Dodd-Frank’s approach does not focus on these different
risks; instead, the Act creates new capital requirements for all banking
institutions, regardless of size.
While many of the rules that regulators issued pursuant to Dodd-
Frank make some attempt to tailor the effect on small banks,105 regu-
lators themselves have acknowledged that more could be done to re-
duce regulatory burdens on community banks.106  Community banks
have different regulatory needs than large banks.  This seems like an
obvious economic realty.  However, the regulatory impact is not bal-
anced in the proper ratio for community banks and the largest
institutions.
A. The Proposed Solution: State Regulation of Community Banks
The first necessary change to reduce the regulatory impact that is
disproportionate on community banks is to immunize them from the
oversight of federal regulation that has been implemented under
Dodd-Frank.  Banks that have total assets below $10 billion would
qualify for this exemption.  This exemption would allow Dodd-Frank
to serve its purpose, that is, reduce the substantial systemic risk the
largest banking institutions have on the national economy.  The ulti-
mate shortcoming of Dodd-Frank is that it fails to adequately differ-
entiate the regulatory needs and requirements of large banking
institutions versus those of small community banks.  However, the dif-
ferences between large and small banks are pronounced.
A bank that has over $1 trillion in assets should not have the same
regulatory requirements, including capital requirements and compli-
ance standards, as a bank that has $5 billion in assets, or a bank with
$200 million in assets.  The size of the bank should correspond to the
regulatory burden imposed.  When a bank has a minimal economic
footprint, it does not make sense to impose stringent capital require-
ments in the name of economic safety.  However, a bank that has a
over a trillion dollars in assets should have increased capital require-
105. SEAN M. HOSKINS & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43999, AN ANALYSIS
OF THE REGULATORY BURDEN ON SMALL BANKS (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R439
99.pdf.
106. See Daniel Wilson, Small Banks Slam ‘One Size Fits All’ Dodd-Frank Regs, LAW360
(Sept. 16, 2014, 5:47 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/577496/small-banks-slam-one-size-fits-
all-dodd-frank-regs (Tony Bland, OCC Senior Deputy Comptroller for Midsize and Community
Bank Supervision, stated, “We understand a one-size-fits-all approach doesn’t work,” concluding
that his agency “could do more” to reduce regulatory burdens on smaller institutions.).
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ments because the risk of collapse has a greater potential to affect the
economy as a whole.  Currently, Dodd-Frank does little to distinguish
between the regulatory burdens imposed on banks based on their rel-
ative size.
This proposal does not mean that community banks are exempt
from any and all regulation.  The second way Congress must act is to
institute a uniform regulatory policy, to be adopted by the states, simi-
lar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), that allows states to reg-
ulate community banks.  A uniform approach to banking regulation is
important, but it is wholly unnecessary to institute a new regulatory
agency for the sole purpose of regulating community banks.  State
governments should regulate community banks through a uniform ap-
proach instituted by Congress.  Not only are these banks relationship
lenders within the community, but perhaps it is time for community
banks to have regulation based on relationship principles as well.  By
allowing states to regulate community banks, federal regulators would
be able to focus on large banking institutions.  They would not have to
waste time and money by performing on-site compliance checks at the
thousands of banks across the country.  Instead, states would have the
authority to regulate community banks, which is advantageous for nu-
merous reasons.  First, community banks impact the local economy,
and second, states are much more concerned with their economy than
with the national economy.
The largest banks have a broad range of activities that cross state
and national lines.  Community banks, on the other hand, largely op-
erate within a small geographic area.107  This geographic limitation en-
hances the viability and effectiveness of state regulation, as opposed
to federal regulation.  This would also ease the burden on federal reg-
ulators by substantially limiting the number of regulated banks.
There are a little over one hundred banks that have assets over $10
billion.108  Federal regulatory agencies would be able to exclusively
focus on these banks.  This would eliminate the burden on regulators
to control the entire banking industry.  Further, regulators will be able
to make rules that apply to these banks, and not have to increase costs
by studying the potential effects such rules would have on community
banks.  There would be no need for two sets of rules from the federal
regulators, instead, they could write and apply rules that are necessary
to prevent megabanks from failing.
107. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 4, at 3-1. R
108. See NAT’L INFO. CTR., supra note 24.
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On the other hand, states will have the ability to create rules that
will focus on community banks.  The ability for regulators to focus on
the needs of the industry will be a substantial improvement over the
current system.  Good and effective regulation is brought about
through focus and sensitivity of those being regulated.  In order for
the banking industry to be properly regulated, the banking industry
must be completely reclassified into two categories: community banks
and megabanks.  This will allow each component of the banking in-
dustry to have effective regulation.  A system of regulation that fails
to differentiate the impact that these two types of banks have on the
economy is ineffective regulation.  This type of regulation also brings
back the historical system of regulation that was a long-standing as-
pect of the United States banking system.  Banks have long been state
chartered institutions, and now is the time to return to state regulation
over community banks.
B. Benefits and Shortcomings of This Approach
The benefits of this new approach to state regulation is that it would
substantially decrease the costs of regulation on community banks,
but it would also continue to impose the strictest oversight over the
largest banking institutions.  This would allow community banks to
maximize profits in order to maintain competitiveness.  Therefore,
banks would then begin lending again and focus on the individual,
rather than the credit report.  This could boost economic growth on a
local level, but, as noted previously, this has a multiplicative effect.109
Yet, there are some shortcomings to this proposal.  This system re-
quires a complete overhaul of the current framework, and thus would
only be possible by congressional authority.  Congress should act to
create this new framework because it will enhance the viability of
community banks and boost the economy on a local level throughout
the country.  However, under this framework, each state would have
to also pass a version of the uniform bill, similar to the UCC, which
takes time and could create some unpredictable results.  Some states
may incorporate different versions of this proposed Uniform Commu-
nity Banking Act, which could lead to non-uniform banking practices,
depending on the state.  However, the Act could solve these by man-
dating certain portions to be incorporated by the states.
109. See CMTY. BANKING CONNECTIONS, supra note 29, at 12-13.
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C. Other Reform Proposals
Dodd-Frank has been a controversial law since its passage.  Any law
that substantially increases the regulatory oversight over a single in-
dustry will inevitably bring disagreement.  There is considerable litera-
ture by commentators, industry analysts, law review contributors, and
both private and publicly sponsored studies on the effects of Dodd-
Frank.  Depending on the internal bias of the commentator, such re-
ports have drawn differing conclusions about the successes and short-
comings of Dodd-Frank.  Many liberal commentators have argued
that Dodd-Frank is working and that the regulations provide an ade-
quate safety net for the financial system.110  Their main argument is
that Dodd-Frank allows regulators to potentially prevent another fi-
nancial crisis such as the one experienced globally during the Great
Recession of 2007.111  Conservative economists and commentators
typically find the regulation to be overly burdensome, which stifles
economic activity.112  They also argue that Dodd-Frank is an attempt
to micromanage banks and the financial markets, when a free market
approach is what leads to economic development.113  There are pros
and cons to both sides.  Free markets are a benchmark of capitalism,
and they certainly allow for the creation of capital and economic de-
velopment.  However, there are risks in a total laissez-faire system,
and it is possible that regulation, to some extent, can help curb these
risks and allow for sustainable market growth.114
Regulation is not likely going to be eliminated, but this fact should
not make regulators or lawmakers complacent.  The best way for the
financial sector to develop and the economy to grow is to have sus-
tainable regulation of high quality.  Thus, good regulation should be
the ultimate aim.  One of the major problems with Dodd-Frank is that
110. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Obama’s Other Success: Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Is Work-
ing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/paul-krugman-
dodd-frank-financial-reform-is-working.html?_r=0.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Jeb Hensarling, Opinion, After Five Years, Dodd-Frank Is A Failure: The Law
has Crushed Small Banks, Restricted Access to Credit, and Planted the Seeds of Financial Instabil-
ity, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2015, 5:50 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-five-years-dodd-
frank-is-a-failure-1437342607.
113. See id.
114. See generally Diego Valderrama, FRBSF Economic Letter: Financial Development, Pro-
ductivity and Economic Growth, FED. RESERVE BANK SF 2 (June 27, 2003), http://www.frbsf.org/
economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2003/june/financial-development-productivity-
and-economic-growth/#subhead3 (noting that a common finding of various studies show that a
positive impact of financial development on growth depends on the quality and supervision of
financial regulations).
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it allows regulators broad power to do as they please because the rules
written by these regulating agencies are often short sighted.
One commentator argued that the best alternative to Dodd-Frank is
to create a tiered system of regulation.115  Arthur E. Wilmarth argues
that Dodd-Frank does not adequately address the regulatory needs of
community banks, and it also fails to curb the risks posed by
megabanks.116  Wilmarth’s argument presents a solution that the regu-
latory approach should instead be two-tiered approach, an approach
compatible with this Article.  However, the proposal in this Article
differentiates itself on the basis of who the regulatory bodies are for
community banks.  Wilmarth argues that there should be a substantial
loosening of community bank regulation,117 but there should also be
increased requirements for megabanks.  In order to keep community
banks a vital resource for the economy, a new regulatory approach is
vital.  However, the best method to regulate community banks is
through local and regional regulatory oversight so that the regulation
can be focused on the needs of the community banks and the banking
sectors in the states.
The counterargument to state regulation of community banks is that
the banking industry is, for the most part, removed from state bound-
ary identification.  While banks certainly may not want to cope with
fifty different regulatory bodies, the proposed approach argued here is
to have these different regulatory bodies regulate the banking indus-
try within their state, but only the community banks.  This would not
apply to the largest banks in the United States.  These banks would
still have to be regulated on a federal level, simply from a practical
point.  “The 10 banks with the most branches together accounted for
almost one-third of all locations in the U.S.”118  This will have a lim-
ited impact on community banks.  The largest banks in the U.S. are
truly engrossed in interstate commerce; however, community banks
operate primarily within limited geographic locations.  Thus making
this regulatory approach truly viable.
This type of regulatory approach would also allow for the distribu-
tion of regulatory costs to be allocated to the states and away from the
federal government.  This would decrease a substantial regulatory
115. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed to Preserve




118. Alexander E.M. Hess, Banks With the Most Branches, USATODAY (Oct. 5, 2014, 7:00
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/10/05/24-7-wall-st-banks-with-most-
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burden on the federal government, and federal regulators would be
better able to shift their focus and attention on the largest banks.  The
largest banks require significantly more regulation than community
banks, due to their size and economic footprint.  Community banks do
not pose the same systemic economic risks that large banks pose on
the financial system.  Further, states are most apt to regulate commu-
nity banks by providing for certain measures that could be favorable
in one state, but not in another.  This would allow the regulatory prac-
tices to be hyper-focused, which would lead to growth and productiv-
ity.  Further, overall regulatory costs would diminish because the
regulations would be specific to community banks and the megabanks,
respectively.
Continuing to have federal regulators authority over the largest
banks allows them to focus on rulemaking that affects these banks
while state regulators would be able to focus on rulemaking that im-
pacts community banks.  This focus is important because it allows the
regulation to be more effective and less burdensome.  Further, since
community banks have a much smaller economic footprint, there is no
great risk that even a substantially deregulated industry would have
negative consequences.  The opposite is more likely.  By drawing a
clear line as to what type of banking institution qualifies for the ex-
emption based on size may give borderline banks pause if considering
a merger or further takeovers.  This allows the community banking
industry to flourish and increases competition throughout the
industry.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Dodd-Frank has a disproportionate impact on the regulation of
community banks.  It has helped to continue the trend of consolida-
tion and centralization of the banking industry.  It is clear that if the
trend of consolidation continues, community banks will not be viable
competitors in the banking industry.  This result is not good for local
communities that depend on community banking.  Further, this could
lead to increased standardization of banking practices, which ulti-
mately leaves the consumer at the mercy of institutional banks.
Dodd-Frank has failed to curb the “too big to fail” banks, and in the
years since its passage, these banks have grown larger than ever
before.  Regulators have attempted to write rules that apply equally to
community banks and institutional banks, but these rules fail to grasp
the significance of size disparity and capital requirements.  It is neces-
sary for Congress to act to remedy this problem and stabilize the
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banking sector through regulation designed to address the specific
needs of community banks as well as the needs of megabanks.
This Article argued for a new regulatory framework under which
banks would have to make a choice between merging (and increasing
their regulatory burdens) and remaining under the $10 billion thresh-
old.  This proposal would promote community bank competition and
would also enhance regulations by streamlining and focusing on the
unique demands that different-sized banking institutions have.  This
process could take time to implement, and, therefore, it is imperative
that Congress acts quickly to resolve this problem.  Community banks
continue to suffer from increased regulatory burdens imposed by the
thousands of Dodd-Frank rules and requirements even though they
played no substantial role in the development of the economic crisis.
These rules are meant for banking institutions that have significant
economic footprints and pose a risk to the overall economy.  Commu-
nity banks pose no such risk, and it is time for immediate action to
remedy this problem and allow community banks to remain viable
competitors.  If Congress fails to act, community banks will continue
to disappear at rapid rates.
In order for regulation to work effectively, it must be focused and
specialized.  The current regulatory system composed under Dodd-
Frank is not specialized or focused.  It fails to adequately attend to the
regulatory needs of community banks.  The number of regulators has
increased substantially, but the systemic risk posed by the megabanks
has not been diminished.  These costs are ultimately borne by taxpay-
ers, yet taxpayers are actually paying for ineffective shortsighted regu-
lation.  Instead, regulation should be divided between the federal
government and the states by allowing the states the responsibility
and authority to regulate community banks chartered in their state.
Federal regulators would maintain responsibility over megabanks, and
this would allow them to redouble their focus on providing rules that
build an adequate safety net against economic collapse.  This two-
tiered approach would be beneficial for both community banks, as
well as federal regulating agencies.
